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RECENT ARBITRATION DECISIONS INVOLVING DISCIPLINE
AND DISCHARGE This note discusses several recent discharge and
discipline awards, particularly as they relate to the question of juris-
diction. If one can draw any conclusion from such a limited survey,
it will be the conclusion that there are indications of a trend towards
a narrower conception of an arbitration board's powers. This trend
has certain implications for collective bargaining.
Alteration of Penalty without Power in Agreement
The recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina v.
Bigelow, Ex Parte, International Nickel Company' is of considerable
significance in discharge and discipline grievances where a collective
agreement gives an arbitrator no power to modify a penalty. The
case involved a discharged employee who had 29 years of seniority
with the company and was five years away from a pension. 2 The
employee had a long record of absenteeism and alcoholism and had
received numerous warnings over the years and a number of minor
suspensions. Because of his efficiency when at work and his long
seniority, the Company had never discharged him. In 1958, the
year prior to his discharge, he received only warnings except for
three short suspensions of four days or less. The Board refused to
uphold the discharge but granted a seven-month suspension.
A few quotes from the arbitration board award will assist in
setting forth the problem faced by the Court of Appeal on the applica-
tion of the Company to quash the award. At page 186 of the award
the following paragraphs appear:
Now, in ordinary circumstances, it would seem to be abundantly clear
that the grievor's record of service with the company, particularly In
the last four years, was by no stretch of the imagination a satisfactory
one and that on the basis of his record alone, let alone his last offence,
the company would have been more than justified in discharging such
employee. (Italics are mine).
Yet for previous absences in 1958 because of alcoholism, the grievor
remained unpunished and undisciplined except for warnings. On the
three previous occasions when he was punished, he was punished by
suspensions for one, three and four days respectively. If we assume that
those are punishments for his first, second and third offences that the
company thought merited punishment, then it seems to us unreasonable
particularly in this case, with its mitigating factors, that for his fourth
offence, he should be discharged. (Italics are mine).
And finally:
For if he is to remain discharged at the age of 55, five years away from
the time when he may elect to be pensioned, it means the end of his
active and no doubt, his working life. He knows, apparently, how to
perform only one job; he likes his job; and when he is performing it,
1 [1959) O.W.N., p. 245.2 For a full report of the case see Labour Arbitration Cases, Vol. 9, p. 18.
Further citation of Labour Arbitration Cases are referred to as L.A.C.
he does so with more than ordinary competence. And it is possible-
even probable-that being out of work for over seven months, earning
no income all that time, so far as we are aware, and enduring the ordeal
of a board of arbitration meeting to discuss whether the utmost possible
punishment meted out to him by the company should stand or fall, an
experience, no doubt, as solemn to him as it was new, may have the
beneficial result that he will no longer offend as he has in the past.
These three paragraphs clearly point up the dilemma faced by
the arbitration board. On the one hand, the board was determined
that the employee should be penalized for his conduct. On the other
hand, it refused to ignore the employee's seniority, his competence
when at work, his age, and the degree of penalty imposed in the past.
The board, not surprisingly, awarded a lengthy suspension.
The result of the Court of Appeal decision is to make such solu-
tion impossible in the absence of a specific power in the agreement.
In allowed the motion to quash, the Court said as follows: 3
The jurisdiction of the board was to determine the issues between the
parties and was expressly confined by the agreement between the com-
pany and the union, to that function. The issue simply was whether the
employee was discharged for just cause. The board ought to have directed
itself to that issue and to that issue only.
The result of the Bigelow case appears to be that the arbitration
board can, under such circumstances, only give a "yes" or itno"
decision. Should it decide the mitigating factors are so weighty that
just cause for discharge does not exist, it must allow the grievance
without penalty. On the other hand, should it decide the offence
justifies the discharge, the grievance must be dismissed without
alteration in the penalty.
This often places an arbitrator in an extremely difficult position.
The dilemma he is placed in can, and often does, result in inequitable
decisions.
This contention is illustrated by an analysis of two cases.
The first, Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited and Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers Union,4 involved the discharge of an employee for
carelessness. The grievor had seniority of five years, only one year
of which was spent on the job in which the carelessness took place.
The Board, headed by Judge Anderson, held that its function was
confined, first, to ascertaining whether or not the employee was
careless. Then, having found that he was, the Board went on to say it
next had to rule on whether the carelessness was sufficient to enable
the company to discharge. The Board came to the conclusion that
there was substantial cause for discharge and dismissed the grievance
while declaring that it had no power to alter the penalty. The grievor
and the union were, I am certain, not greatly consoled by a statement
in the report declaring the employee a satisfactory one and express-
ing the hope that the company would re-hire him in another capacity.
3 [1959] O.W.N., p. 245 at p. 246.
4 L.A.C. Vol. 4, p. 239.
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The other side of the same coin is exemplified by the recent case
of Re Sudbury and District General Workers Union, Local 902, and
Neelon Steel Limited.5 There a grievor had been repeatedly warned
for failing to weigh his truck empty before loading and was found
to be lying on two occasions with regard to such circumstances. He
was warned he would be discharged for the next offence. On the
next occasion he lied again and was discharged but the evidence
revealed his behaviour resulted from certain extenuating circum-
stances. In his decision, arbitrator Judge Little said as follows:5a
I have carefully considered all the events leading up to the discharge of
the grievor and must come to the conclusion that the penalty imposed
was too drastic. In reaching this decision, I must make it clear that I
do not condone the grievor's failure to tell the truth. It is to be deplored
and, in my view, the company would have been justified in taking some
form of disciplinary action such as a severe reprimand or suspension.
... I wish it were in my power to impose some penalty in lieu of dis.
charge, but my powers under the agreement are limited. Under the
heading "general" on page 3 of the agreement, he is entitled to be
reimbursed for all time lost since the date of discharge. (Italics are mine.)
Undoubtedly many will sympathize with Judge Little's unhappi-
ness about the case.
This is not the place to discuss the merits of the Bigelow decision
on the question of jurisdiction. Its reasoning gives judicial support to
many past arbitration board awards6 and one can safely assume that
it will be followed by many arbitrators in the future. It should be
pointed out, however, that the situation in respect to alteration of
penalty in discharge cases differs in the United States. In a recent
article, Professor Archibald Cox, perhaps the leading American auth-
ority in the field of arbitration, states that most arbitrators in the
United States find an implied power to reduce penalties in both dis-
charge and discipline cases.7 This fact alone is sufficient to illustrate
the controversial nature of the decision.
Presuming that we must live with the Bigelow reasoning in
Ontario, it is submitted that the mutual interest of labour and man-
agement would be served by granting arbitrators the power to dispose
of discharge grievances equitably. A "yes" or "no" answer to just
cause for discharge often leads to unfair decisions. A gray rather
than a black or white award may be infinitely more appropriate in
the circumstances.
5 L.A.C. Vol. 9, p. 257.
5a Ibid., at p. 260.
6 See the following cases as examples:
Retail-Wholesale, Local 440, in Re Borden Company Limited, L.A.C. Vol.
2, p. 681.
United Steelworkers of America in Re The Steel Company of Canada,
L.A.C. Vol. 3, p. 1009.
Mine, Mill 4 Smelter Workers, Local 598, and International Nickel Co.
Ltd., L.A.C. Vol. 3, p. 989.
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2900, and John Inglis, L.A.C.
Vol. 6, p. 259.
Galt Malleable Iron Company, United Steelworkers Arbitration Series,
p. 1-106.
7 See Reflections Upon Labour Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. p. 1482.
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In the past, management has generally opposed granting powers
to arbitrators to alter discharge penalties imposed by it. This is,
perhaps, understandable because companies felt such powers could
only work to their disadvantage by resulting in reduced penalties.
However, the circumstances in the Neelon case are such, as to be
likely to arise more often in the future. Coupled with the implica-
tions of the Bigelow decision, the inflexibility imposed on the arbi-
trator may lead to unfair results to management. Arbitrators,
faced with a situation where some lesser penalty than discharge
appears desirable may be inclined to find that just cause for discharge
did not exist. Employees deserving some penalty will then be let off
scot-free.
It is interesting to note that an increasing number of collective
agreements in the province give arbitrators the power to make equit-
able dispositions of discharge grievances. No statistical studies on
the number of agreements in which such a provision appears are
available. However, on the basis of personal observation, it seems
likely that over half of collective agreements in Ontario contain
such a provision in the event of discharge.
Implications of the Bigelow Decision on Discipline Grievance
This is certainly not the situation with respect to discipline,
where relatively few collective agreements in Ontario grant powers
to dispose of grievances equitably. In most contracts the only refer-
ence to discipline is contained in the management's rights clause.
Management is normally given the right to discipline for just cause.
The Bigelow decision raises some interesting and important prob-
lems in the field of discipline. These can be illustrated by a brief
example. Suppose an employee with ten years seniority has turned
out some defective work after being warned to use special care. Let
us assume, as fair minded persons, that the offence justifies a two-
day suspension. Let us assume, however, that management imposes
a six-month suspension, or even a year's suspension.
If, as the Bigelow decision suggests, the function of the Board
is confined to ascertaining whether the employee was disciplined for
just cause, can the arbitration board reduce the penalty to some-
thing more reasonable than one year? In our example, we have
assumed there was just cause for some discipline. It is only the
degree of discipline which appears inequitable. Can the board allevi-
ate the penalty in the absence of power in the agreement to equitably
dispose of the grievance?
At least one arbitrator has held that he had no power to reduce
the harshness of a disciplinary penalty in such circumstances. In the
case of United Packinghouse Workers of America, Local 293, and
Quaker Oats Company of Canada,8 Judge R. S. Clark said as follows:
8 L.A.C., Vol. 4, p. 1268 at 1271.
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The clause relating to discharge cases referred to above, gives a Board
of Arbitration a discretionary power to make any other arrangement(short of discharge) which is just and equitable in the opinion of the
conferring parties. No such discretion is accorded to it under the clause
referring to management rights under Clause 7, and once it is estab-
lished that discipline has been imposed with reasonable cause, and if
arrived at honestly, even though harshly in the opinion of the grievor
or the bargaining agency, the Board cannot interfere by revising the
employer's decision....
This reasoning can be attacked with considerable force. Men are
not hanged for traffic violations and it would seem only right for
an arbitration to evaluate the propriety of the penalty according to
the seriousness of the offence. Many arbitrators would, I believe,
agree that the question of whether just cause existed for the particular
disciplinary action taken is important. However, the Bigelow decision
may tend to reinforce the type of thinking outlined above in the
Quaker Oats case. In the field of discipline, this may raise even
more difficult problems than in discharge. In discharge cases, the
determination of just cause involves in itself a quantitative deter-
mination of the seriousness of the offence. If the offence is not
sufficiently serious, the arbitrator can allow the grievance. But in
the area of discipline, the arbitrator may be confined to finding
whether some cause of discipline existed. The quantitative check
present in discharge is then lacking if the Bigelow reasoning applies
and markedly inequitable results could flow from its operation.
If the thinking of the Bigelow case becomes more prevalent in
future arbitration cases, it appears likely that strenuous efforts will
be made by the labour movement to give wider powers to arbitrators
in the area of discipline. Presumably these will take the form of
attempting to extend the discharge clause which now appears in
many collective agreements, so that it covers discipline.
At the root of the question involved in alteration of penalty in
both discipline and discharge cases is the differing conception of the
nature of an arbitrator's powers under collective agreements. The
Bigelow decision reinforces those who say the arbitrator's powers
are confined strictly to those conferred upon him by the agreement.
There are, of course, other points of view held by authorities in both
the United States and Canada. The Bigelow decision represents one
point of view. Professor Archibald Cox puts the other view concisely
in a recent article in the Harvard Law Review: 9
Collective agreements, because of the institutional characteristics al-
ready mentioned, are less complete and more loosely drawn than many
other contracts; therefore, there is much more to be supplied from the
context in which they were negotiated. The governing criteria are notjudge-made principles of the common law but the practices, assumptions,
understandings and aspirations of the going industrial concern; the
arbitrator is not bound by the conventional law though he may follow
it. If we are to develop a rationale of grievance arbitration, more work
should be directed towards identifying the standards which shape arbitral
opinions.
9 Reflections Upon Labour Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, at p. 1500.
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In view of the divergence of opinion on the major points in-
volved in the Bigelow decision, it is to be regretted that the Court of
Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. One can hardly agree with what the writer understands
was the reason for refusal, namely, that the issues involved were local
and not of sufficient public importance. It is my belief that the de-
cision will have a decided effect in both arbitrator's future decisions
in the area of discharge and discipline as well as on future collective
bargaining.
Jail Sentences and Leave of Absence
While the recently reported decision of Re United Steelworkers of
America and Algoma Steel Corporation° does not have the general
significance of the Bigelow award, it again raises some interesting
points in regard to the matter of jurisdiction. The grievor, an em-
ployee with six years' seniority, was arrested while on his day off and
charged with impaired driving. He was convicted and received a 30-
day sentence, whereupon he applied for a leave of absence. The
Company refused the leave of absence and in accordance with the
seniority article, removed the employee from the seniority rolls.
The board reviewed the leave of absence clause and found that
the Company had unlimited rights to refuse leave of absence. But
it went further and stated: loa
I was not referred to, nor have I found, any provision in the collective
agreement which imposes upon the company the obligation of granting
a leave of absence to enable the employee to serve a gaol term. In
my view if the parties had intended that there should be any such
obligation upon the company there would have to be some specific
language in the agreement covering the matter.
A substantial number of collective agreements provide that
leave of absence is to be granted for reasonable cause. Even had such
wording existed in the Algoma case, it appears on the above reason-
ing that the board would have declined jurisdiction.
Aside from the problem of jurisdiction, the question of leave of
absence in jail sentences is worthy of comment. Failure of the parties
to deal specifically with it often leads to inequitable results. The
problem is not a simple one and can be illustrated by an example.
Let us assume that an employee with six months of service is jailed
for ten years for robbing a bank. Is it reasonable to expect that
management should be obliged to rehire him at the end of his
sentence? Naturally not. On the other hand, let us assume that an
employee with twenty years' seniority is jailed for ten days for
impaired driving. It is submitted that he should not lose the substan-
tial interest he has in his job under these circumstances. This might
be the case if seniority is automatically lost after a certain number of
days of absence without leave.
10 L.A.C. Vol. 9, p. 276.
10a Ibid., at p. 281.
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If.future arbitration boards take the Algoma approach to the
problem and refuse to deal with it unless specifically covered by the
agreement, it may be necessary to avoid inequity by adding to the
contract. The drafting of a clause to cover leave of absence in the
event of jail sentences is a difficult task. It should take into con-
sideration such factors as (i) the type of offense (ii) the length of
the jail sentence (iii) the seniority of the employee and (iv) his
service record. Management's decision should then be made subject
to an arbitrator's review and the same factors would be given weight
by him."
Conclusion
Can one draw any conclusions from this brief review? Only a
few recent cases have been mentioned, and they concern only dis-
charge and discipline. However, the Bigelow, Neelon and Algoma
awards have all been handed down in the last six months. The
Court of Appeal decision in the Bigelow case must be accorded con-
siderable weight. When added together with other decisions they
seem to indicate an increasing unwillingness on the part of arbitra-
tors to stray from the strict confines of the agreement. The same
trend is evident in other areas of contract administration such as
contracting out and compensation in the event of improper lay-off.12
Perhaps the one salient recent example to the contrary is the Polymer
award.13
Whether one agrees with this trend or not, more lengthy and
detailed collective agreements are likely in the future. It is difficult
to be happy with the situation because it appears to fly in the face
of common sense. In this regard one agrees with Professor Laskin
when he says in the Polymer award:' 4
The parties to a collective agreement must be utterly bewildered to
know that notwithstanding the successful consummation of an agree-
ment (which by legislation is binding on Company, Union and em-
ployees) and notwithstanding the statutory direction for final and binding
arbitration of contract disputes, they really have no obligation to carry
out the agreement because they should have expressed this obligation
twice instead of once. Of course, if the views expounded in the Deloro
case become pervasive enough the parties to a collective agreement
may come to believe that in law you must reinforce your binding
promises by an additional covenant that they shall be enforceable.
While one may agree with Professor Laskin, there exists a duty
to clients to tell them that Professor Laskin's view is a minority
opinion, and that they must protect themselves by reinforcing bind-
ing promises by additional covenants. This is certainly true in the
matter of alteration of penalty on discharge or discipline or leave of
absence for jail sentence and in many other areas of contract admin-
For a similar approach to the problem see United Automobile Workers
and Ford Motor Company L.A.C. Vol. 8, p. 210.
12 See particularly Re United Steelworkers of America and Deloro Smelt-
ing and Refining Company Ltd., L.A.C. Vol. 9, p. 159, for a case of failure
to provide for advance notice of lay-off under the seniority article.
13 L.A.C. Vol. 10, p. 51.
14 Ibid., at pp. 62-3.
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istration. Failure to give such advice may expose clients to unhappy
results and lawyers to considerable criticism from clients.
We in Ontario are moving towards an era of more complicated
and legalistic collective bargaining agreements.
Martin L. Levinson-=
LIABILITY OF STOREKEEPERS TO PERSONS WHO COME
ONTO THE PREMISES TO BUY Once a shop is open for
business the shopkeeper is potentially liable for injuries suffered by
customers while on his premises.
First, he is responsible for negligent acts committed either by
himself or his servants in the course of their employment. Secondly,
he is liable as the occupier of property for injuries caused by defects
in the premises themselves. It is with this second aspect of his
responsibility that this article is specifically concerned.
The general principles of negligence do not apply to the occupier
of property. There is not one single standard of reasonable care
the breach of which results in an obligation to all persons injured
because of such negligence. Instead, we find a complex set of rules
which classifies persons entering property in accordance with their
business interests. Once persons are classified, a corresponding duty
is imposed on the occupier on an ascending scale from a nominal
duty towards a trespasser to the more onerous duty toward a
person invited to the premises for a legitimate business reason.,
This judicial approach was strongly criticized by Denning L.J. (as
he then was) in Dunster v. Abbott,2 where he remarked:
A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a
trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until youdo business with him is he an invitee. Even when you have done business
with him, it seems rather strange that your duty towards him shouldbe different when he comes up to your door from what it is when he
goes away.
He further observed that the system was too rigid, resulting
either in injustice in borderline cases or the expansion of existing
categories to meet cases falling clearly within the accepted areas.
However, in the case of White v. Imperial Optical,3 Barlow J.
recently reaffirmed that the categories of invitee, licensee and tres-
passer remain the basis of defining an occupier's liability in the
Province of Ontario.
*Mr. Levinson is in the Fourth Year at Osgoode Hall Law School. Thispaper was presented to the Labour Relations Section of the Ontario Bar
on February 5, 1960.
I Robt. Addle & Sons (Collieries) Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [19291 A.C. 358.
2 [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572.
3 (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 496 (Ont.).
Notes
